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21. Introduction
This short note presents a mathematical analysis of infinite regresses of
probabilistic justification (for short: probabilistic regresses) with an emphasis
on their rôle in recent discussions of infinitism. A probabilistic regress is an
infinite regress of epistemic justification based on a comparison of conditional
probabilities at each stage of the regress. The main finding of this paper
is that every probabilistic regress which satisfies certain natural conditions
derived from its forward-iteration solution is mathematically consistent. At
the end of this article, we discuss the implications of this result for the
foundationalist rejection of infinitism.
The paper is organised as follows: We begin, in Section 2, with a review
of the Probabilistic Regress Problem, largely based on the recent paper by
Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7]. In Section 3 and Section 4, we formalise the
notions of a probabilistic regress and its closed-form solvability; then, we
briefly summarise Peijnenburg and Atkinson’s [7] example of a probabilistic
regress which allows for a closed-form solution (Section 5). In Section 6, we
state and prove the main result of this paper: Every probabilistic regress
whose forward-iteration solution avoids obvious contradictions already has a
mathematical model (in terms of a probability space and a sequence of events
on that probability space which carry the conditional probability assignments
prescribed by the regress). In the final section of the paper (Section 7), we
propose a modification of the foundationalist stance with respect to infinite
regresses of probabilistic justification: Whilst “harmless”, i.e. solvable and
consistent probabilistic regresses do exist (as in the examples of Peijnenburg
[6] or Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7]), probabilistic regresses are generically
not solvable.
2. The Probabilistic Regress Problem
The Regress Problem is a long-standing foundationalist challenge to
infinitism, dating back at least to the days of Russell [9] and C.I. Lewis
[4]. The most basic version, henceforth called the Basic Regress Problem,
reads: “If my belief in some proposition p0 is justified by my belief in
some other proposition p1, which in turn is justified by my belief in
yet another proposition p2, and so on ad infinitum, then there is no
epistemic justification for my belief in any of the propositions pk.” The
probabilistic counterpart of the Basic Regress Problem, which will be called
Probabilistic Regress Problem, asserts: “If my belief in some proposition
S0 is probabilistically supported by my belief in S1, which in turn is
probabilistically supported by my belief in S2, and so on ad infinitum, then
there is no probabilistic justification for my belief in any of the propositions
Sk.” (Herein, propositions are identified with events, as is ubiquitous practice
in probability theory.)
There are two classical lines of argument for both the (Basic) Regress
Problem and for the Probabilistic Regress Problem: Firstly, finite minds are
incapable of performing an infinite number of probabilistic calculations (cf.
e.g. Fumerton [3]). Secondly, inference of Sn from Sn+1 does not originate
justification for Sn, but only transfers any previous justification for Sn+1 to
Sn; this means that in a regress — be it of the basic, traditional kind or of
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the probabilistic sort — none of the Sn should actually be seen as justified
(cf. e.g. Dancy [1]).
In order to clarify the assertion of the Probabilistic Regress Problem,
we still need to provide a rigorous definition of the concept of probabilistic
support, as introduced by Peijnenburg [6] and Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7].
Herein and in all of this paper, we shall follow the notational conventions
of probability theory rather than those of propositional logic when it comes
to denoting complementary or negated events; the complement of an event
A is denoted by {A (rather than “¬A”). Informally speaking, an event B
probabilistically supports A if and only if A is more probable given B than
given non-B:
Definition 1. Let A,B be events on some probability space (Ω,A, P ).
(a) If P (B) > 0, then the ratio P (A∩B)P (B) is called the conditional
probability of A given B and denoted P (A|B).
(b) B is contingent if and only if 0 < P (B) < 1.
(c) B probabilistically supports A if and only if B is contingent and
P (A|B) > P (A|{B).
3. Probabilistic regresses
Before we can analyse the Probabilistic Regress Problem formally, we
need to make the notions of a probabilistic regress and of its closed-form
solvability precise. This will be accomplished in Section 3 and Section 4,
respectively. In all of this paper, the set of non-negative integers will be
denoted by N.
The infinite regress outlined in the Probabilistic Regress Problem is
completely determined by the probabilities P (Sk|Sk+1), P (Sk|{Sk+1), k ∈ N
— where P (Sk|Sk+1) > P (Sk|{Sk+1) for all k ∈ N. For this reason,
we identify probabilistic regresses with pairs of sequences of (conditional)
probability values (i.e. elements of [0, 1]) where one sequence strictly
dominates the other. With this terminology, amodel of a probabilistic regress
is essentially a pair of a probability measure and a sequence of events which
carry the conditional probability assignments specified through the regress:
Definition 2. Let α = 〈αk〉k∈N and β = 〈βk〉k∈N be sequences of real
numbers.
(a) 〈α, β〉 is a probabilistic regress if and only if αk, βk ∈ [0, 1] and
αk > βk for all k ∈ N.
(b) Let 〈α, β〉 be a probabilistic regress. A model of 〈α, β〉 is a pair
〈P, S〉, wherein P is a probability measure with domain A and S =
〈Sk〉k∈N ∈ AN, such that
(1)
∀k ∈ N 0 < P (Sk+1) < 1, P (Sk|Sk+1) = αk > βk = P (Sk|{Sk+1).
(c) A probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉 is consistent if there exists a model
〈P, S〉 of 〈α, β〉.
(d) If 〈α, β〉 is a probabilistic regress, we define
γk = αk − βk
for all k ∈ N.
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The analysis of probabilistic regresses would be much simpler if we were
to demand that αk, βk ∈ (0, 1) for all k ∈ N.
Remark 3. Whenever 〈P, S〉 is a model of some probabilistic regress
〈α, β〉, then P (Sk) > 0 for all k ∈ N.
(All proofs can be found in Appendix A.)
Thus, one always has P (S0) > 0 whenever 〈P, S〉 is a model of a
probabilistic regress. This refutes, in the strongest possible sense, the claim
that P (S0) = 0 should hold for all models of probabilistic regresses — an
assertion that can be traced back to Russell [9] and C.I. Lewis [4, p. 173]
(as explained by Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7]).
4. Solvable probabilistic regresses
A probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉 is solvable if for any model 〈P, S〉 of 〈α, β〉
one can derive a closed-form expression for P (S0).
It is difficult to provide a precise definition of solvability, since the notion
of a closed-form expression is not a well-defined mathematical concept.1
However, if there were universal agreement on the set C of closed-form
expressions of real numbers, a candidate for a definition of closed-form
solvability would be as follows: A probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉 is solvable (in
closed form) if there exists some p ∈ C∩ (0, 1] such that for any model 〈P, S〉
of 〈α, β〉, one can prove P (S0) = p (in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the
Axiom of Choice, say).
An important argument in favour of the Probabilistic Regress Problem
is the claim that no probabilistic regress is solvable (e.g. C.I. Lewis [4]).
In their recent article, Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7] have confounded this
claim by providing an example of 〈α, β〉 where one can easily derive that
P (S0) =
1
2 for any model 〈P, S〉 of 〈α, β〉.
In order to get a better understanding what it means, in general, for a
probabilistic regress to be solvable, we note with Peijnenburg [6, Equation
(13)] and Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7, Equations (4),(5)] that P (Sk) is
given by a recursion equation and disentangle this recursion equation through
forward iteration:
Remark 4 (and Definition). Let 〈P, S〉 be a model of some probabilistic
regress 〈α, β〉. Then,
(2) ∀k ∈ N P (Sk) = αkP (Sk+1) + βkP ({Sk+1).
1Whilst all rational numbers should certainly be counted as closed-form expressions,
it is less clear, which irrational numbers should be included. Are all algebraic numbers
closed-form expressions — even those which cannot be defined through radicals? What
about certain transcendental numbers (like pi or the Euler number e or some exogenously
given constants)? Should the set of closed-form expressions be closed under the application
of rational functions or special functions (e.g. exponential, trigonometric, hyperbolic
functions)? All one can say is that in all of theses cases, any candidate for set of closed-
form expressions will be a countable set C of real numbers. (The set of algebraic numbers
is countably infinite, since it is the set of zeroes of polynomials with integer coefficients and
there are only countably many such polynomials and they all will have only finitely many
zeroes. Moreover, the set of transcendental numbers which can be regarded as closed-form
expressions will be countable. Finally, the set of rational functions is countable and the
set of special functions is also countable.)
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so
(3) ∀k ∈ N P (Sk) = βk + γkP (Sk+1), ,
hence by forward iteration
(4) ∀k, n ∈ N P (Sk) = P (Sk+n+1)
n∏
i=0
γi+k +
n∑
`=0
β`+k
`−1∏
i=0
γi+k
and finally
(5) ∀k ∈ N P (Sk) = lim
n→∞P (Sk+n+1)
n∏
i=0
γi+k +
∞∑
`=0
β`+k
`−1∏
i=0
γi+k,
provided the limits exist.
For k = 0, we obtain the equation
(6) ∀n ∈ N P (S0) = P (Sn+1)
n∏
i=0
γi +
n∑
`=0
β`
`−1∏
i=0
γi,
which Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7, Equations (6)] already mention. In
particular,
(7) P (S0) = lim
n→∞P (Sn+1)
n∏
i=0
γi +
∞∑
`=0
β`
`−1∏
i=0
γi
provided the limits exist.
5. An example of a solvable probabilistic regress
Peijnenburg [6] and Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7] have suggested
examples of probabilistic regresses in which P (S0) can be easily computed
via Equation (7), thus resolving the regress and confounding the two
aforementioned foundationalist objections — the finite-mind and the transfer
objection — for these particular examples of regresses.
Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7] studied the sequences α, β defined by
∀k ∈ N αk = 1− 1
k + 3
, βk =
1
k + 3
,
hence
∀k ∈ N γk = k + 1
k + 3
.
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For these choices of α and β, calculations2 lead to
(9)
P (S0) = lim
n→∞P (Sn+1)
2
(n+ 2)(n+ 3)
+
1
3
+
1
2
− 1
3
− lim
n→∞
(
1
n+ 2
− 1
n+ 3
)
,
thus
P (S0) =
1
2
.
Hence, this particular probabilistic regress is easily solvable, refuting the
foundationalist view of regresses in principle. Following Peijnenburg [6], we
note that a model of the probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉 is solvable if both (i)∑n
k=0 βk
∏k−1
i=0 (αi − βi), which is the second term in Equation (6), can be
explicitly calculated (at least in the limit as n → ∞) with a closed-form
solution and (ii) there exists some constant c0 such that
∀k ∈ N 1 > c0 > αk − βk > 0.
For instance, this is the case if α and β are just constant and α1 > β1.
The question remains, however, whether probabilistic regresses based
on certain sequences α, β — in particular, for the sequences suggested by
Peijnenburg [6] and Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7] — actually exist: Given
sequences α, β satisfying some obvious conditions which follow from Equation
(5) and the definition of a probabilistic regress, is there a (countably additive)
probability measure P and a sequence of events S such that 〈P, S〉 is a model
of the probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉? The answer is affirmative, as we shall see
in the next section.
6. The consistency of probabilistic regresses
Remark 5. Let 〈α, β〉 be a probabilistic regress. Then, the limit ∏∞k=0 γk
exists (and is ≥ 0).
We now introduce a necessary criterion for the consistency of a
probabilistic regress, viz. admissibility. Informally speaking, a probabilistic
regress is admissible if and only if Equation (5) does not immediately lead
to contradictions. Interestingly, it will turn out that admissibility of a
probabilistic regress is also sufficient for consistency.
Definition 6. A probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉 is admissible if either
• ∏∞k=0 γk > 0, or
2We calculate as follows. First, it is clear that the first term in Equation (6) can be
simplified as a telescoping product via
(8) ∀n ∈ N
n∏
i=0
γi =
2
(n+ 2)(n+ 3)
and that the addends of the second term can be written as
∀k ∈ N βk
k−1∏
i=0
γi =
1
k + 3
2
(k + 1)(k + 2)
=
1
k + 1
− 2
k + 2
+
1
k + 3
=
1
k + 1
− 1
k + 2
−
(
1
k + 2
− 1
k + 3
)
,
whence the second term in Equation (6) is a telescoping sum. Summarising this, one
obtains Equation (9).
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• (a) βk > 0 for infinitely many k, and
(b)
∑∞
`=0 β`+k
∏`−1
i=0 γi+k < 1 for all k ∈ N.
Indeed, if 〈α, β〉 is not admissible, then Equation (5) readily rules out the
existence of a model of 〈α, β〉, as one can see from the proof of the following
Lemma:
Lemma 7. Let 〈α, β〉 be a probabilistic regress. If 〈α, β〉 is not admissible,
then it is not consistent.
So, admissibility of a probabilistic regress is a necessary condition for
consistency. The main theorem of this paper shows that the converse is also
true.
Theorem 8 (Consistency of Probabilistic Regresses). A probabilistic
regress 〈α, β〉 is consistent if and only if it is admissible.
The proof of the sufficiency of admissibility for consistency is obtained
by taking the nonstandard limit (as n → ∞), in the sense of Robinsonian
nonstandard analysis [8] and Loeb probability theory [5], of the following
lemma:
Lemma 9. Let α, β ∈ [0, 1]n, let εn ∈ (0, 1) and suppose αk > βk for
all k ≤ n. Then there exist a probability space (Ω,A, P ) as well as events
Sn,εn0 , . . . , S
n,εn
n ∈ A such that 0 < P (Sn,εnk ) < 1 for all k ≤ n and
(10) ∀k < n− 1 P (Sn,εnk |Sn,εnk+1 ) = αk > βk = P (Sn,εnk |{Sn,εnk+1 )
as well as P (Sn,εnn ) = εn.
Theorem 8 can be used to verify that the solvable probabilistic regress
proposed by Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7] (see Section 5 above) is admissible
and hence consistent. 3
From Theorem 8, we may also deduce that any conceivable value p of
P (S0) is attained in a model of some probabilistic regress:
Corollary 10. For every p ∈ (0, 1), there exists some probabilistic
regress 〈α, β〉, such that P (S0) = p holds for any model 〈P, S〉 of 〈α, β〉.
3In order to prove that the regress defined in Section 5 is admissible, first remark that
βk > 0 holds for all k ∈ N. Consider an arbitrary k ∈ N. Then, using Equation (8),
∞∑
`=0
β`+k
`−1∏
i=0
γi+k =
∞∑
`=0
β`+k
`+k−1∏
i=k
γi =
∞∑
`=k
β`
`−1∏
i=k
γi
=
∞∑
`=k
β`
`−1∏
i=0
γi/
k−1∏
j=0
γj =
∞∑
`=k
β`
`−1∏
i=0
γi/
k−1∏
j=0
γj
=
∞∑
`=k
1
`+ 3
2
(`+ 1)(`+ 2)
(k + 1)(k + 2)
2
= (k2 + 3k + 2)
∞∑
`=k
1
(`+ 1)(`+ 2)(`+ 3)
(11)
Note that
∀` ∈ N (`+ 1)(`+ 2)(`+ 3) = (`+ 1)(`2 + 5`+ 6) = `3 + 6`2 + 11`+ 6
≥ `3 + 27
5
`2 +
243
25
`+
729
125
= (`+ 9/5)3,
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In all of this paper, we have required P to be countably additive — so
that standard terminology from probability theory could be used. However,
at least for questions of consistency and admissibility, this requirement is
redundant: Suppose that P is a finitely additive probability measure on
an algebra A, and let S = 〈Sk〉k∈N be a sequence of algebra elements that
satisfies Equation (1) for some probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉. Then, one can still
derive Equation (5). Hence, if 〈α, β〉 were not admissible, we could mimick
the proof of Lemma 7 to produce a contradiction. For this reason, any regress
which is not admissible will not even have a finitely additive model. Theorem
8 can thus be strengthened as follows: A probabilistic regress is admissible
if and only if it has a finitely additive model, in which case it even has a
(countably additive) model. Hence, in the analysis of probabilistic regresses,
the distinction between finitely additive and countably additive probability
measures turns out to be irrelevant. (For a systematic comparison of finitely
additive and countably additive probability measures in epistemic contexts,
cf. e.g. Schurz and Leitgeb [10].)
7. The nongenericity of solvable probabilistic regresses
The main theorem of this article establishes that every admissible
probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉 possesses a model, i.e. there exists a probability
whence
∞∑
`=0
β`+k
`−1∏
i=0
γi+k ≤ (k2 + 3k + 2)
∞∑
`=k
1
(`+ 9/5)3
≤ (k2 + 3k + 2)
∞∑
`=k
∫ `
`−1
(x+ 9/5)−3 dx
= (k2 + 3k + 2)
∫ ∞
k−1
(x+ 9/5)−3 dx
= (k2 + 3k + 2)
[
− (x+ 9/5)
−2
2
]∞
x=k−1
= (k2 + 3k + 2)
(k + 4/5)−2
2
=
1
2
k2 + 3k + 2
k2 + 8k/5 + 16/25
=
k2 + 3k + 2
2k2 + 16k/5 + 32/25
.
Now,
k2 + 3k + 2
2k2 + 16k/5 + 32/25
≥ 1⇔ k2 + k/5− 18/25 ≤ 0⇔ (k + 0.1)2 ≤ 0.73,
so
∀k ∈ N>0 k
2 + 3k + 2
2k2 + 16k/5 + 32/25
< 1
and hence by the previous chain of inequalities
∑∞
`=0 β`+k
∏`−1
i=0 γi+k < 1 for all k ∈ N>0.
For k = 0, Equation (11) yields
∞∑
`=0
β`
`−1∏
i=0
γi = 2
∞∑
`=0
1
(`+ 1)(`+ 2)(`+ 3)
= 2
∞∑
`=1
1
`(`+ 1)(`+ 2)
= 2× 1
4
=
1
2
< 1,
therefore
∑∞
`=0 β`+k
∏`−1
i=0 γi+k < 1 holds for all k ∈ N. Hence, this particular regress is
admissible and thus consistent.
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measure P and a sequence S of P -measurable events which satisfy the
conditional probability assignments given by 〈α, β〉 through Equation (1).
A corollary of that theorem shows that P (S0) can attain just any value
between 0 and 1 (exclusive) in some probabilistic regress. It follows that
there exist solvable consistent probabilistic regresses. In another application
of the theorem (footnote 3), we have verified the consistency of the simple
solvable regress that was recently constructed by Peijnenburg and Atkinson
[7].
An inspection of the examples of Peijnenburg [6] and Peijnenburg and
Atkinson [7] immediately reveals, however, that the solvability of these
regresses depends on some kind of gerrymandering with α and β, in order
to obtain (i) certain combinatorial features which lead to cancellations in
the second term of Equation (7) and (ii) certain topological peculiarities
which ensure that the first term in Equation (7) vanishes. This, however, is
definitely not a generic feature of probabilistic regresses.
Therefore, even after the findings of Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7]
and of this article, the foundationalists might still argue as follows:
Notwithstanding the fact that there are solvable consistent regresses, at least
generically, a probabilistic regress does not admit a closed-form solution, let
alone a solution that can be verified with a short proof (as in the example
of Peijnenburg and Atkinson [7]). This suffices to support a new, although
admittedly rather weak version of the (Probabilistic) Regress Problem: “If
my belief in some proposition S0 is probabilistically supported by my belief
in S1, which in turn is probabilistically supported by my belief in S2, and
so on ad infinitum, then there might be a probabilistic justification for my
belief in proposition S0, but generically there is no closed-form solution for
P (S0).” The probability P (S0) will be strictly positive for any probabilistic
regress (see Remark 3), but generically we are unable to calculate or estimate
it explicitly; for a given regress, P (S0) might be very close to zero.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Remark 3. We only have to show that P (S0) > 0. However,
from the inequalities (1), one gets P (S0|S1) = α0 > 0, which means that
P (S1) > 0 and P (S0 ∩ S1) > 0, thus P (S0) > 0. 
Proof of Remark 4. Let k ∈ N. Then, by the definition of a
probabilistic regress, we have
P (Sk) = P (Sk ∩ Sk+1) + P (Sk ∩ {Sk+1) = αkP (Sk+1) + βkP ({Sk+1),
which is Equation (2). Equation (2) immediately yields Equation (3). From
here, mathematical induction in n leads to
∀k, n ∈ N P (Sk) = P (Sk+n+1)
n∏
i=0
γi+k +
n∑
`=0
β`+k
`−1∏
i=0
γi+k
(where we use the convention
∏−1
i=0 γi = 1). In the limit, one obtains
Equation (5), provided the limits on the right-hand side of Equation (5)
exist. 
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Proof of Remark 5. For all n ∈ N, one has ∏nk=0 γk ≥ 0. On the
other hand, 0 ≤ βk < αk ≤ 1 means that 0 < γk ≤ 1, whence
∏n+1
k=0 γk ≤∏n
k=0 γk for all n ∈ N. Therefore, 〈
∏n
k=0 γk〉n∈N is a decreasing sequence
which is bounded from below (by 0), hence it must have a (nonnegative)
limit, viz. inf {∏nk=0 γk : n ∈ N}. 
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose 〈α, β〉 is not admissible. There are two
cases to be considered:
(a)
∏∞
k=0 (αk − βk) = 0 and βk = 0 for all but finitely many k. In this
case, there is some m ∈ N such that βk = 0 for all k ≥ m, and
Equation (5) already yields that P (Sk) = 0 for all k ≥ m. This
contradicts the definition of a probabilistic regress.
(b)
∏∞
k=0 (αk − βk) = 0 and
∑∞
`=0 β`+k
∏`−1
i=0 (αi+k − βi+k) ≥ 1 for
some k ∈ N. Then P (Sk) ≥ 1 due to Equation (5), so P (Sk) = 1,
which again contradicts the definition of a probabilistic regress.

First, we will give the proof of Theorem 8; afterward, we shall turn to
the proof of Lemma 9.
Proof of Theorem 8. Lemma 7 shows that consistency of a
probabilistic regress implies admissibility.
We will now prove the converse. Let 〈α, β〉 be a probabilistic
regress. In the notation of Lemma 9, consider the probability space
(∗Ω, ∗A, ∗P ) and the double-indexed family ∗ 〈Snk : k ≤ n, n ∈ N〉 =〈∗Sn,εnk : k ≤ n, n ∈ ∗N〉. The Loeb probability space (∗Ω, σ(∗A), L(∗P ))
(cf. Loeb [5]) will eventually furnish us with a model of the probabilistic
regress 〈α, β〉.
By the Transfer Principle of Robinsonian nonstandard analysis [8], we
must have 0 < ∗P
(
Sn,εnk
)
< 1 for all n ∈ ∗N and k ≤ n as well as for all
n ∈ ∗N and k < n
∗P (∗Sn,εnk |∗Sn,εnk+1 ) = ∗αk > ∗βk = ∗P (∗Sn,εnk |{∗Sn,εnk+1 ).
Therefore, if we fix any c ∈ (0, 1), we have for any infinite N ∈ ∗N and every
k ∈ N that 0 < ∗P (∗SN,ck+1) < 1 and
(12) ∗P (∗SN,ck |∗SN,ck+1) = αk > βk = ∗P (∗SN,ck |{∗SN,ck+1).
This implies
∗P (∗SN,ck ) = βk + (αk − βk) ∗P (∗SN,ck+1),
and by iteration, we obtain for all k, n ∈ N,
∗P (∗SN,ck ) =
∗P (∗SN,ck+n)
n∏
i=0
γk+i +
n∑
`=0
βk+`
`−1∏
i=0
γk+i
(analogously to Equation (4)), hence in particular
(13) ∗P (∗SN,ck ) =
∗P (∗SN,cN )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=c
N−k∏
i=0
γk+i +
N−k∑
`=0
βk+`
`−1∏
i=0
γk+i.
THE CONSISTENCY OF PROBABILISTIC REGRESSES 11
If
∏∞
i=0 γi > 0, then for every infiniteN ∈ ∗N, one has
∏N
i=0 γi  0. If β` > 0
for infinitely many `, then there must be some β` > 0 with k ≤ ` ∈ N.
In both cases, Equation (13) will yield that ∗P (∗SN,ck )  0 (for arbitrary
k ∈ N). Moreover, Equation (13) shows that ∗P (∗SN,ck )  ∗P (∗SN,c
′
k ) for
any c′ ∈ (c, 1), hence ∗P (∗SN,ck ) 1.
Finally, we obtain from Equation (12) that
L(∗P )(∗SN,ck |∗SN,ck+1) = αk > βk = L(∗P )(∗SN,ck |{∗SN,ck+1)
for all k ∈ N.
Thus,
〈
L(∗P ),
〈
∗SN,ck
〉
k∈N
〉
is a model of the probabilistic regress 〈α, β〉.

Now, let us turn to the proof of Lemma 9. The probability space
(Ω,A, P ) whose existence is asserted in the Lemma will be an arbitrary
atomless probability space; for the sake of completeness, let us recall the
definition.
Definition 11. A probability space (Ω,A, P ) is called atomless if and
only if for all A ∈ A with P (A) > 0, there exists some B ⊂ A such that
0 < P (B) < P (A).
For example, the probability space given by the Lebesgue measure on
the unit interval [0, 1] is atomless.
The proof of Lemma 9 uses the following equivalent characterisation of
atomlessness:
Proposition 12. A probability space (Ω,A, P ) is atomless if and only
if for all A ∈ A and for every α ∈ [0, 1] there exists some B ⊆ A such that
P (B) = αP (A).
Proof of Proposition 12. See e.g. Fremlin’s treatise [2, p. 46,
215D]. 
Proof of Lemma 9. Let (Ω,A, P ) be an atomless probability space.
The sets Sn,εnk will be constructed through backward recursion in k. For the
initial step of the recursion note that since (Ω,A, P ) is atomless, Proposition
12 yields the existence of some event Sn,εnn with probability εn.
Now suppose Sn,εnk+1 , . . . , S
n,εn
n with
∀` > k P (Sn,εn` ) > 0
and
∀` ∈ {k + 1, · · · , n− 1} P (Sn,εn` |Sn,εn`+1 ) = α` > β` = P (Sn,εn` |{Sn,εn`+1 )
are given. We have to construct Sn,εnk . Since (Ω,A, P ) is atomless,
Proposition 12 teaches that there must be some subset Ank of S
n,εn
k+1 of
probability αkP (S
n,εn
k+1 ) and that there must also be a subset B
n
k of {S
n,εn
k+1 of
probability βkP ({Sn,εnk+1 ). Finally, we put
Sn,εnk = A
n
k ∪Bnk .
Then, since αk > βk ≥ 0 and P (Sn,εnk+1 ) > 0, we readily have
P (Sn,εnk ) ≥ P (Ank) = αkP (Sn,εnk+1 ) > 0.
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Moreover, we see that
αk =
P (Ank)
P (Sn,εnk+1 )
=
P (Sn,εnk ∩ Sn,εnk+1 )
P (Sn,εnk+1 )
= P (Sn,εnk |Sn,εnk+1 )
(as P (Sn,εnk+1 ) > 0) and
βk =
P (Bnk )
P ({Sn,εnk+1 )
=
P (Sn,εnk ∩ {Sn,εnk+1 )
P ({Sn,εnk+1 )
= P (Sn,εnk |{Sn,εnk+1 )
as P ({Sn,εnk+1 ) > 0. 
Proof of Corollary 10. Let p ∈ (0, 1), and put q = 2pp+1 . Define
αk = q and βk = q2 for all k ∈ N. Then, γi = q2 for all i ∈ N. Then, for
every k ∈ N, one has both αk > βk > 0 and
∞∑
`=0
β`+k
`−1∏
i=0
γi+k =
q
2
∞∑
`=0
(q
2
)`
=
q
2
1
1− q2
=
q
2− q
= p.(14)
Therefore, 〈α, β〉 is an admissible probabilistic regress, whence, by Theorem
8, it must have a model 〈P, S〉. Finally, we have
lim
n→∞P (Sn+1)
n∏
i=0
γi = lim
n→∞P (Sn+1)
(q
2
)n+1
= 0
by sandwiching, and if we insert k = 0 in Equation (14), we have∑∞
`=0 β`
∏`−1
i=0 γi = p. Therefore, Equation (7) readily shows that P (S0) =
p. 
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